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Abstract  
This study examines the effect of budget participation on budgetary slack using information asymmetry 
and organizational commitment as a moderating variable. Hypotheses proposed to this study are budget 
participation will have a positive effect on budgetary slack, the information asymmetry will have a positive 
effect on the relationship of budget participation and budgetary slack, organizational commitment will 
have the negative effect on the relationship of budget participation and budgetary slack. This research is 
located in Cilacap Regency. Purposive sampling is used to take the samples. The method used in this 
research is survey method. Data collection method that is used questionnaires method. Data analysis 
methods that are used linear regression analysis and regression analysis moderation with an absolute 
difference method. These results shows that budgetary participation has a positive effect on budgetary 
slack, and the information asymmetry strengthens the effect of budget participation to budgetary slack, 
additionally, the results show that organizational commitment debilitation the effect of budgetary 
participation to budgetary slack. 




Implementation of regional autonomy causes changes in the area of financial management in the form of budgeting 
reforms from traditional budget system to performance budget system. In the budgeting process should include the 
participation in various parties. Budget planning process of participatory model often creates some problems. 
According to Hansen and Mowen (2007) budget participation has the potential problem on the standard used tend to 
be too high or too low and there is a tendency manager performs budgetary slack. When subordinates pressed to 
achieve the targeted budget, it allows the tendency to make budgetary slack. 
One of the factors that have influence on the emergence of slack is the participation in the budget. Previous research 
that examined the relationship between budgetary participation and budgetary slack showed inconsistent results. 
Research conducted Young (1985), Hafsah (2005), Falikhatun (2007), Bangun, et al. (2012) and Ajibolade and 
Akinniyi (2013) show that the budget participation has a positive relationship with budgetary slack. Unlike Dunk 
(1993), Ramdeen, et al. (2007), Kren and Maiga (2007) and Ardanari and Putra (2014) who found that high budget 
participation can reduce the occurrence of budgetary slack. The inconsistency of the results of previous studies 
allegedly because there are other variables that affect the relationship between participation in the preparation of the 
budget for the possibility of budgetary slack. Factors that affect the relationship between budgetary participation 
and budgetary slack are asymmetry of information and organizational commitment. 
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The budget is used as a tool to measure the performance,so that in the preparation of the budget should be based on 
realistic expectations and conditions. In reality there is often a difference between the budget drawn up with the 
realization achieved. It also occurs to budget and actual budget Cilacap Regency, Indonesia at 2010 - 2015 as Table 
1 below: 
Table 1: Budget and Actual Revenue Cilacap regency Year Budget 2010 - 2015 (in thousands of rupiah) 
Year 
 
Regional Revenue Budget 
(RP) 
 
Realization of Regional 
Income  (Rp) 




2010 1.315.167.381 1.334.620.370 101.48 
2011 1.610.106.238 1.639.234.442 101.81 
2012 1.730.602.349 1.792.439.254 103.57 
2013 2.074.300.760 2.121.355.398 102.27 
2014 2.286.449.415 2.367.534.100 103.55 
2015 2.716.710.060 2.737.224.737 100.76 
Average 1.955.556.034 1.998.734.717 102.24 
 
Table 2.Budget and Expenditure Realization Cilacap Regency Fiscal Year 2010 - 2015 (in thousands of rupiah) 
Year 
Expense Budget Area 
(Rp) 
Expense Realization Area 
(Rp) 




 2010 1.433.670.672 1.299.429.295 90.64 
2011 1.751.202.584 1.550.277.519 88.53 
2012 1.952.975.779 1.792.586.828 91.79 
2013 2.289.524.271 2.047.162.545 89.41 
2014 2.569.979.136 2.205.741.809 85.83 
2015 3.151.326.472 2.657.124.478 84.32 
Average 2.191.446.486 1.925.387.079 88.42 
Based on Table 1 and 2 above can be seen that the realization of regional income is always higher than the budget 
revenue defined areas. In addition, the realization of regional spending is always lower than the budget defined 
areas. Based on the results of previous studies are inconsistent, and the gap between budget and realization in 
Cilacap Regency, so the researchers were motivated to reexamine the influence of budget participation on 
budgetary slack with information asymmetry and organizational commitment as a moderating variable in Unit in 
Cilacap Regency, Indonesia. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Formulation 
Goal setting theory originally proposed by Locke (1968), which shows the relationship between the objectives and 
the performance of one's tasks. This theory explains the relationship between the goals set targets to be achieved. 
Through goal setting theory can be explained that the participation in the budget will affect the resulting outputs and 
outcomes to be expected to optimize the organization's goals are maximum performance. The desire to be able to 
achieve the performance is what will ultimately bring budgetary slack. 
Agency Theory can be defined as a concept that describes the relationship between principals and agents. The focus 
on the agency theory is the existence of information asymmetry, in which agents have better information than the 
principal. Based on the assumption of agency theory, a person tends to be opportunistic or selfish personal interests, 
including in the budgeting process, subordinates will draw up a budget that is likely to provide profits for itself by 
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creating budgetary slack. Therefore, the agency theory can be used to explain the relationship between budget 
participation and budgetary slack. 
3. Research Hypotheses 
3.1 Budget Participation and Budgetary Slack 
Hansen and Mowen (2007) stated that the participation of the budget provides an opportunity for managers to 
perform budgetary slack. Performance-based budgeting system, the process of the development of efficient and 
participatory where the performance as a benchmark for the success of an organization in the implementation of 
government activities. However, the assessment of performance based on budget targets achieved or not can lead to 
a budgetary slack. 
The above statement is supported by the results of the study Young (1985), Falikhatun (2007), Ikhsan and La Ane 
(2007), Bangun, et al. (2012), Ajibolade and Akkiniyi (2013), and Oktorina and Soenarno (2013) which says that 
the budget participation has positive influence on budgetary slack, so that the hypothesis can be derived as follows: 
H1:Budget participation have positive effect on the budgetary slack. 
3.2 Budget Participation, Information Asymmetry, and Budgetary Slack 
Based on agency theory, will act in an opportunistic human being is a personal interest rather than the interests in 
the organization. Agents will be motivated to increase compensation for the future to improve its performance, 
while the principals are motivated to increase the utility and profitability. The principal can not monitor the 
activities of an agent every day. Instead, the agent knows important information about the capacity of self, the work 
environment and the organization as a whole. This has caused the asymmetry of information, namely the imbalance 
of information about principal and agent. 
The asymmetry of information that occurs to the principal and the agent who participated in budgeting can lead to 
budgetary slack. The interaction between budgetary participation and information asymmetry can lead to budgetary 
slack (Young, 1985). This theory is supported by Djasuli and Fadilah (2011), Aprilia and Hidayani (2012), Faria 
and Silva (2013), and Dewi and Yasa (2014) that the interaction budget participation and information asymmetry 
have positive influence on budgetary slack. Based on the description of the hypotheses proposed are: 
H2 : Information asymmetry strengthen the influence of budget participation on budgetary slack. 
3.3 Budget Participation, Organizational Commitment, and Budgetary Slack 
Organizational commitment can serve as a psychological tool in running a particular organization. High 
organizational commitment would reduce the willingness of an employee to create budgetary slack. Conversely, a 
low organizational commitment means an employee more priority to personal interests and tend to budgetary slack. 
This is supported by research Nouri and Parker (1996). Ikhsan and Ane (2007) stated that the Organizational 
commitment able to moderate the effect of the participatory budget in budgetary slack. Similarly Desmiyati (2009), 
Marfuah and Listiani (2014), and Murtin (2016) states that organizational commitment negatively affect the 
relationship between budgetary participation and budgetary slack. 
Based on the literature review and the results of previous research, it can be concluded that the process of budgetary 
participation is also determined by the commitment of the implementer, when individuals pursue personal interests 
that have organizational commitment is low, then the individual participation in budgeting will attempt to budgetary 
slack so that its performance look good, in other words that organizational commitment is able to affect the 
relationship of participation budgets for budgetary slack. Thus, the researchers propose hypotheses as follows: 
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4. Research Model 










Figure 1. Research Model 
 
 
5. Research Methods 
This research is quantitative. According to Cooper and Schindler (2011), quantitative research trying to take 
measurements accurate to one study.The location will be used as a place of research is the Cilacap Regency, 
Indonesia. The population in this study are middle management in Cilacap Regency, Indonesia. Sampling method 
using purposive sampling, is sampling technique with a certain considerations (Sugiyono, 2011). The sample in this 
study were 80 respondents including Head Office and Head of Planning Subsection. Methods of data collection 
using a questionnaire survey. 
6. Variable Operation Concepts and Definition 
6.1  Budget Participation  
Budget participation is a process that involves people directly in it and have an influence on the preparation of 
budget performance objectives will be assessed and will likely be rewarded on the basis of their budget goal 
achievement (Milani, 1975). Participation in the research budget is the level of involvement and influence of 
individuals involved in local budgeting. Instruments to measure variables participation in budgeting adopting 
instruments used in research Milani (1975). 
6.2 Information Asymmetry  
Information asymmetry is a condition in which the subordinate information beyond their superiors (Dunk, 1993). 
Information asymmetry in this study is the difference information held between superiors and subordinates, in 
which subordinates have better information than the boss. Variable information asymmetry was measured with an 
instrument developed by Dunk (1993). 
6.3 Organizational Commitment 
Organizational commitment is the attitude shown where people favor the organization and objectives of the 
organization and maintain membership in order to achieve organizational goals. (Mowday et al, 1979). 
Organizational commitment in this research is the attitude of an employee who always sided with his office and 
have a strong desire to achieve agency objectives, and maintain membership in the institution. The indicators used 
in this study using indicators developed by Mowday et al (1979). 
6.4  Budgetary Slack 
Budgetary slack  the delivery amount of the budget easier to achieve (Dunk, 1993). Budgetary slack in this study is 
the difference in the amount of the budget drawn up by the competent authorities to plan the budget with the best 
estimate that can actually be achieved. The instrument used to measure the budgetary slack variables using 
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7. Results and Discussion 
7.1 Data Analysis 
Hypothesis 1 was tested using linear regression analysis, while the second and third hypotheses were tested using 
regression analysis with an absolute difference method. The results can be seen in the following explanation: 
1. Equation 1: 
To determine the influence of budget participation on budgetary slack, used simple linear regression test with the 
results listed in Table 3 as follows: 
Table 3. The influence of the Budget Participation budgetary Slack 
Predictors Coefficient α 
Constants 0.741 0.065 
Budget  Participation 0.786 0,000 
Dependent variables: budgetary slack 
 Based on Table 3 regression equations can be formulated as follows: 
BS = 0.741 + 0.786 BP  
Information: 
BS = Budgetary Slack 
BP = Participation Budget 
2. Equation 2: 
To determine the influence of information asymmetry in the relationship of budget participation on budgetary slack, 
used regression analysis moderation with an absolute difference method. Based on the results of tests performed 
obtained values listed in Table 5. 
Table 4. Moderating Effect of Effect of Information Asymmetry in the Budget Participation on Budgetary Slack 
Predictors Coefficient α 
Constants 4.130 0,000 
ZBP 0.286 0,000 
ZAI 0,003 0.951 
| ZBP-AI | 0.135 0,042 
Dependent variables: budgetary slack 
 Based on Table 4 can be obtained regression equation as follows: 
BS ZBP = 4.130 + 0.286 + 0.003 + 0.135 ZAI | ZPA - ZAI | 
Information: 
BS: budgetary Slack 
ZBP   : Variable budget participation standardized  
ZAI   : Variable information asymmetry standardized  
| ZBP - ZAI | : Absolute Difference standardized information asymmetry variables 
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Based on the above equation it can be seen that the budgetary participation standardized variables, variables 
standardized information asymmetry, and the absolute difference standardized information asymmetry variables 
have a positive influence on budgetary slack. 
3. Equation 3 
Based on the results of tests performed obtained values are listed in Table 5. 
Table 5. Moderating Effect of Organizational Commitment under the influence of the Budget Participation on 
Budgetary Slack. 
Predictors Coefficient α 
Constants 4.321 0,000 
ZBP 0,299 0,000 
ZOC -0.134 0,005 
| ZBP-ZOC | -0.093 0,047 
Dependent variables: budgetary slack 
 Based on Table 5, the regression equation can be obtained as follows: 
BS = 4.0321 + 0.299 ZBP - ZOC 0.134 - 0.093 | ZBP - ZOC | 
Information: 
BS       : Budgetary Slack 
ZBP     : Variable budget participation standardized  
ZOC     : Variable organizational commitment standardized  
| ZBP - ZOC | : Absolute Difference organizational commitment variable standardized  
Based on the above equation it can be seen that the budgetary participation variables standardized positive influence 
on budgetary slack, while variable organizational commitment standardized, and organizational commitment 
variable absolute difference standardized negatively affect budgetary slack. 
7.2 Hypothesis Testing 
Summary results of the regression analysis of the hypothesis 1 to 3 can be seen in Table 6 as follows: 
Table 6. Summary of Results of Regression Analysis 
Variable Coefficient α 
 
Conclusion 
BP .786 0,000 H1 accepted 
| ZBP-AI | 0.135 0,042 H2 accepted 
| ZBP-OC | -0.093 0,047 H3 accepted 
Based on Table 6 can be explained as follows: 
a)  Hypothesis 1 
Regression analysis showed BP coefficient is 0.786 with a value of α = 0.000 <0.05, which shows that the 
budgetary participation variable positive and significant impact on the budgetary slack. H0 rejected and Ha 
accepted. Thus the first hypothesis stated that budget participation has positive influence on budgetary 
slack is acceptable. 
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b) Hypothesis 2 
Regression analysis moderation in Table 9 shows that the absolute difference in the coefficient of 
standardized information asymmetry variables (b3) is 0.135 with a value of α = 0.042 less than 0.05, which 
means that the information asymmetry strengthen the influence of budget participation on budgetary slack. 
H0 rejected and Ha accepted. Thus Hypothesis 2 stated that the information asymmetry strengthen the 
influence of budget participation on budgetary slack is acceptable. 
c) Hypothesis 3 
Regression analysis moderation in Table 9 shows that the absolute difference in the coefficient of 
standardized organizational commitment variable is -0.093 with a value of α = 0.047 less than 0.05, which 
means that the organization's commitment to weaken the influence of budget participation on budgetary 
slack. H0 rejected and Ha accepted. Thus the third hypothesis which states that the organization's 
commitment to weaken the influence of budget participation on budgetary slack is acceptable. 
7.3 Discussion 
i) Effect of Budget Participation of the Budgetary Slack 
The results of hypothesis testing showed budget participation significant effect on budgetary slack on the 
Cilacap Regency, Indonesia. Results showed that the structural officials, especially Top Management and 
Middle Management participated well in the preparation of the budget.   
Participation in Cilacap Regency have a high influence on the budgetary slack. This shows that individuals 
who participate in the budgeting, the higher the chances of budgetary slack . 
The results are consistent with research conducted by Lau and Eggleton (2003), Bangun, et al. (2012), 
Ajibolade and Akkiniyi (2013), Oktorina and Sunarno (2013), Kartika (2010), Falikhatun (2007), Ikhsan 
and Ane (2007), Merchant (1981), Young (1985), showed that the high participation in the budgeting 
process could lead to budgetary slack (budgetary slack) is also high. The results of this study are not 
consistent with research conducted by Dunk (1993), Ramdeen, et al. (2007), Kren and Maiga (2007), 
Ardanari and Putra (2014) who found that high budget participation can reduce the occurrence of 
budgetary slack. 
The results showed the significant relationship between budgetary participation and budgetary slack, which 
means the higher the participation of the budget will result in increasing budgetary slack. It is caused when 
subordinates are involved in the preparation of the budget and have a great influence on the budget, then 
they will use this opportunity to propose a budget that is easy to achieve and boost their productivity. The 
notion that if the budget available is limited then they should do extra scrutiny against any expenses, so 
that subordinates will propose a budget that is loose by enlarging the proposed budget. Likewise, in order 
to look good performance, then the subordinate would propose a budget that is not too high demands of 
performance, revenue targets are not too high, and the performance goals that are easy to be realized. 
ii) Information Asymmetry Strengthening the Effect of Budget Participation on Budget Slack. 
2nd Hypothesis test results showed that the information asymmetry strengthens the effect of budget 
participation on budgetary slack, which means that the participation of the budget will affect the budgetary 
slack on high information asymmetry. If the information asymmetry that occurs between the agent and the 
principal to participate in budgeting is getting stronger, then it is likely to be stronger budgetary slack 
anyway. The condition of information asymmetry in the regional work units (SKPD) Cilacap district can 
be said to be high, can be seen in the results of the research data descriptive statement that the indicator 
with an average score of 4.04 and the overall indicator significant effect on the interaction of budget 
participation on budgetary slack. Thus, it can be stated that the information asymmetry can amplify the 
effect of budget participation on budgetary slack in Cilacap regency. 
The results are consistent with research conducted by Young (1985), Djasuli and Fadilah (2011), and Faria 
and Silva (2013), Dewi and Yasa (2014) states that the interaction budgetary participation and information 
asymmetry positive and significant impact on the budgetary slack , Based on the above results show that 
when the staff involved in the preparation of the budget have a better understanding of what can be 
achieved in the work, then they will develop a budget that is easy to implement in order to look good 
performance, so it caused a budgetary slack. The results of this study contradict the research conducted by 
Falikhatun (2007), Supanto (2010) and Pello (2014). 
Conditions associated with the theory of information asymmetry agency. According to this theory the 
relationship between subordinates and superiors basically because their interests often at odds with each 
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different parties. Asymmetry of information is a condition in which the principal (employer) does not have 
enough information about the performance of his subordinates, so that subordinates in the process of 
budget participation provides biased information to his superiors. The difference between the information 
owned by subordinates and superiors to be a factor that contributed to the budgetary slack when 
subordinates provide biased information to superiors (Falikhatun, 2007). The existence of information 
asymmetry can lead subordinates tend to overestimate their needs or lowering targets under their true 
performance capabilities. Thus, the interaction between budgetary participation and information 
asymmetry can lead to budgetary slack (Young, 1985). 
iii) Organizational Commitment Weakening Influence of Budget Participation on the Budgetary Slack 
3rd Hypothesis test results indicate that organizational commitments weaken the influence of budget 
participation on budgetary slack (budgetary slack). This means that the participation of the budget will 
affect the budgetary slack in the low organizational commitment, and instead will reduce budgetary slack 
in higher organizational commitment. Employees who have a low organizational commitment would 
prefer their personal interests rather than the interests of SKPD, so when the opportunity to participate in 
the preparation of the budget, they will draw up targets and budget targets are within easy reach so 
assessed as having a good performance. This ultimately led to their budgetary slack. 
Strong organizational commitment in a person will cause people to work hard to achieve the goals of the 
organization in accordance with the planned objectives. This is in line with research conducted by Ikhsan 
and Ane (2007), Latuheru (2005), Dewi and Yasa (2014), as well as Nitiari and Yadyana (2014) shows 
that organizational commitment has a negative influence on the relationship between budgetary 
participation and budgetary slack. The larger the organization, the commitment will cause a decrease in the 
tendency of individuals to perform budgetary slack. The results of this study contradict the research 
conducted by Kartika (2010) which shows that organizational commitment has no effect on the budget and 
slack participation / slack budget. 
Organization's commitment to the regional work units (SKPD) Cilacap in the high category, where 
employees will work in accordance with the rules that exist in the organization and be more professional in 
performing their duties so that organizational goals can be achieved. The influence of budget participation 
on budgetary slack will decline with high organizational commitment. 
8. Conclusions and Recommendations 
8.1 Conclusion 
Based on the results of research on the effect of budget participation on budgetary slack with asymmetry of 
information and the organization's commitment to SKPD in Cilacap District Government it can be concluded as 
follows: 
i) Budget Participation have positive influence on budgetary slack. 
ii) Asymmetry of information strengthens the effect of budget participation on budgetary slack.  
iii) Organizational commitment weaken the influence of budget participation on budgetary slack. 
8.2 Recommendations 
Future studies are recommended to provide a more extensive time to the respondents in order to answer the question 
better and in accordance with the actual conditions and by adding interviews and field observations to advance 
research than just using techniques questionnaire survey, and are advised to consider other factors as independent 
variable or variables moderation. 
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